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ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff-Appellant Colleen Stock Rasmussen ("Stock Rasmussen") here replies to the 
response brief of Defendant-Appellee John Alan Sharapata ("Sharapata"). Stock Rasmussen 
contends that the delineation of issues and authority supporting those issues is sufficiently stated 
in her initial brief. The purpose of this reply brief is to clarify points raised in Sharapata's 
response that are misleading or unfounded. 
I. VOIR DIRE AND CHALLENGE OF JUROR BRANSCOMB 
In his discussion of the standard of review governing the questioning and retention of 
juror Brent Branscomb, Sharapata has summarily dismissed the relevancy of the abuse of 
discretion standard of review governing a party's submission of voir dire questions. Brief of 
Defendant-Appellee at 1 n. 1. The same argument resurfaces later in the brief, where Sharapata 
contends that Stock Rasmussen "admitted" that the trial court acted properly with respect to the 
voir dire of juror Branscomb, and thus the propriety of the trial court's subsequent questioning 
of Branscomb is undisputed. Id. at 9. 
In making such a contention, Sharapata fundamentally misunderstands Stock Rasmussen's 
argument. That argument is divided into two prongs: 
(1) The trial court should have permitted more liberal questioning of Mr. 
Branscomb, in harmony with the principles of Evans v. Doty. 824 P.2d 460 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992), and Barrett v. 
1 
Peterson. 868 P.2d 96 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Should issue (1) be testiiIIvni111 in ShiUiipitLi'.s Lit II iln liul i mi slillll sin inillii! 
have granted Stock Rasmussen's motion for a new trial based on the information 
Stock Rasmussen gleaned in the limited voir dire. 
Sharapata has deemed "irrelevant" and undisputed issue (1), an issue consuming five 
pages of Stock Rasmussen's brief. It is not irrelevant. Sharapata may have concluded that it 
v, "as: inelevant because his understanding of "voir dire" encompasses only those questions asked 
before impanelling, not after. Stock Rasmussen has contended that while Evans and Barrett deal 
extends to questions asked after impanelling when new information requires that those questions 
be asked (as here). Ii i 1:1 le pi e ii i lpai lellii ig \ c ii • :iii e 1:1 ic ti la 1 :: 
behind Evans and Barrett. That understanding, however, did not carry * into its questioning 
of juror Branscomb. Stock Rasmussen was hobbled by I lit tnal com I in Hi it ii|in,«-liuniiiiiii|»t .uul 
this was an abuse of discretion. 
With respect to Sharapata's lengthy treatment of whether Stock Rasmussen could have 
struck (iii'oi" BraiiuYtfiib lin i.msi1, SlMiit[t;tla lias failed to point out that the trial court's failure 
to allow I he von dire requested would have revealed the information needed to determine 
\dinln i llraiiM nmh nlil li< Iwllenj'cd Ion " •" •' ,H IIIK IN I11 ' t Ii.iIIt iu»e<l pen mpionlv I lie imv 
selection process is divided into two phases: ^formation is gathered; (2) counsel may use 
such information to demonstrate a proper cl lal l< i 
the juror. 
Interference with the first phase-gathering information-constitutes reversible error, as 
Evans and Barrett have demonstrated. If the initial information-gathering is interfered with, how 
may a record for appeal be prepared to demonstrate that the juror should have been removed for 
cause? An unsatisfying response to such a query produced the results in Evans and Barrett, and 
that is why those cases do not concern themselves with whether the contemplated challenges in 
those cases would have been for cause or not. Interference with the initial gathering itself is 
sufficient to warrant reversal,1 a point underscored by Barrett in its statement that voir dire 
illuminates information crucial to both for-cause and peremptory challenges. Barrett. 868 P.2d 
at 98. Indeed, the court stated "'the fairness of the trial may depend on the right of counsel to 
ask voir dire questions designed to discover attitudes and biases, both conscious and 
subconscious, even though they "would not have supported a challenge for cause."'" Id. 
(quoting State v. Worthen. 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988)(quoting State v. Ball. 685 P.2d 1055, 
1060 (Utah 1984)))(emphasis original). This point is lost on Sharapata, both in his 
understanding of applicable law and his characterization of Stock Rasmussen's "main contention" 
as being the propriety of challenge rather than the error of refusing liberal voir dire. He has 
attempted to mislead this court by emphasizing the issue of whether Stock Rasmussen's challenge 
would have been for cause (issue (2) above) while ignoring the threshold issue of whether 
1
 In this case, a mistrial should have been granted, but it was not. This illustrates a 
practical difference between voir dire errors committed before impanelling and those made 
after: before impanelling a party may complain that the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to allow certain questions, and this issue will be preserved for appeal. When a juror 
comes forward with previously undivulged information after impanelling, as here, it is 
appropriate for counsel to move for a mistrial based on the fact that a juror will be 
impanelled about which insufficient information has been obtained. An appeal may then be 
taken from the denial of the motion for a mistrial. A practical and effective way to avoid 
mistrials in such instances would be to require that an alternate juror always be available. 
3 
enough information was ever gathered to exercise any kind of challenge (issue (1) above). The 
questions are different, and Sharapata's attempt to mix them is simply wrong. 
H. INCONSISTENT JURY VERDICT 
Sharapata claims that there is "abundant evidence which shows that the Plaintiff herself 
was negligent and that this negligence was the proximate cause of her injuries." Brief of 
Defendant-Appellee at 20. Had the jury indicated that Stock Rasmussen was the proximate cause 
of the accident, this might have been true. But the jury did not so find. Sharapata now asks 
this Court to speculate that the jury may have had grounds to find that Stock Rasmussen was the 
proximate cause of the accident, notwithstanding a blank space in the special verdict form where 
the jury could (and should) have made its analysis of the accident crystal clear. Sharapata 
muddles the issue with discussion of "last clear chance", a doctrine he recognizes is no longer 
viable in Utah with the advent of comparative negligence analysis. Emphasizing, as one should, 
the meat of such analysis, one is compelled to follow this line of reasoning: 
(1) Sharapata was found negligent by the jury. 
(2) That negligence took the form of either a failure to keep a proper lookout, or 
a failure to yield. 
(3) Stock Rasmussen was found negligent by the jury. 
(4) Evidence adduced at trial demonstrates that comparative negligence could not 
have taken the form of anything but failure to use a headlamp. 
(5) Negligence predicated on a failure to keep a lookout or failure to yield 
presupposes the victim's visibility. 
(6) Thus, Stock Rasmussen must have been visible despite her failure to use a 
headlamp. 
(7) Thus, Stock Rasmussen's negligence could not have been a proximate cause 
of the accident. 
Sharapata has introduced contentions that are simply inapposite: no evidence as to any 
other type of comparative negligence was presented to the jury. Sharapata may argue to this 
Court any variety of theory on which to base Stock Rasmussen's liability, but such arguments 
must fall on deaf ears given the record below. 
Sharapata cites the general (and accurate) proposition enunciated in Bennion v. LeGrand 
Johnson Construction Co.. 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985), that there is nothing incongruous with 
a jury finding a party negligent but not the proximate cause of injury. Sharapata's blanket 
citation of this rule betrays his failure to appreciate that in this case, as noted above, there is a 
glaring incongruity with a failure to find proximate cause. Bennion is thus distinguishable on 
its facts. 
A final note as to the marshalling requirement. Stock Rasmussen has clearly stated her 
position as to this requirement in her brief. Based on that statement, it is clear that she is not 
only well attuned to those requirements, but has even attached, for the Court's convenience, all 
relevant portions of the transcript below where any testimony touching on the conduct of either 
her or Sharapata was adduced. Even a cursory examination of the reproduced portions of the 
5 
transcript would illustrate that they favor both sides of this dispute. This is what the marshalling 
rule requires. Sharapata has failed to allege with any particularity what portions of the record 
are missing. Indeed, every citation to the transcript in Sharapata's brief has been attached to 
Stock Rasmussen's brief. Sharapata's argument lacks candor. The marshalling requirement has 
been satisfied. 
m. PROPRIETY OF CLOSING ARGUMENT 
Sharapata contends that the standard of review cited by Stock Rasmussen with respect 
to this issue is once again "irrelevant," admissibility not being at issue. Defendant-Appellee's 
Brief at 3 n.2. To the contrary, admissibility is a key issue, for in passing on the propriety of 
Sharapata's closing argument, this Court must consider the inadmissibility of the evidence 
referred to. Sharapata's further contentions are addressed by the authority cited by Stock 
Rasmussen in her initial brief. 
IV. ERROR IN FOUNDATIONAL OBJECTIONS 
Sharapata contends that Stock Rasmussen has misstated the standard of review concerning 
foundational objections. This is not true. The footnote cited in State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 
(Utah 1991), clearly stated that questions of admissibility are ultimately reviewed for 
correctness. Stock Rasmussen submits that questions of foundation are questions of admissibility 
for purposes of determining the proper standard of review: a court is ultimately required to 
6 
review the proper application of legal principles underlying a foundational ruling in the same 
manner it reviews the legal principles underlying a ruling on admissibility. 
The contention that Stock Rasmussen has not sufficiently identified which evidentiary 
rulings she has objected to is unfounded. In her brief Stock Rasmussen specifically contends 
that she is appealing from foundational objections overruled at trial, and then cites the pages on 
which those objections occurred. No ambiguity or lack of specificity has resulted from this 
approach. 
DATED this J day of August, 1994. 
PHILLIPS. LOWRY 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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